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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses UK domestic bribery. The authors argue that in both domestic and
international contexts, cases are not numerically significant but that changes in how the UK
government approaches bribery in the international context means that, where once
domestic bribery was addressed more rigorously than bribery in the international context,
this imbalance may be being steadily reversed. The paper concludes by setting out the
implications that this identifiable divergence may have for the effective policing of bribery in
the domestic context. The paper makes an empirical and theoretical contribution to the
literature on corruption in the UK.
IMPACT
This paper analyses the UK response to bribery and corruption and provides evidence of a
divergent approach, in terms of strategy, policy and enforcement action, to addressing
bribery in the domestic and international contexts. This has adverse implications for the
prevention, detection, and investigation of bribery. In order to reduce the divergence and
reinforce the domestic focus, governments need to ensure better and more detailed data for
monitoring of the extent of bribery, the presence of a single lead for the domestic context to
ensure consistency and co-ordination, and the availability of training for relevant staff to
make certain relevant stakeholders are alert to emerging corruption issues. The empirically
informed insights and arguments in this paper are relevant to policy-makers and
practitioners working in the area of anti-corruption, as well as non-governmental




law enforcement; UK Bribery
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Introduction and context
Historically in the UK, there has been a divergence in
the attitudes and responses of governments towards
domestic and international bribery by UK persons
(including corporations). Domestic bribery,
particularly of political and public sector personnel,
was increasingly presented as being less acceptable
within a growing expectation of high public
standards and the public interest (Doig, 1984). The
Acts passed in 1889, 1906 and 1916 provided the
legal framework for behaviours, relations and acts
being labelled as ‘corrupt’ in the context of the
domestic (local and central) duties of public officials
with public inquiries (such as those relating to the
Poulson and other corruption scandals in the early
1970s) demanding not only effective anti-bribery
legislation but also related legislation (for example,
conflict of financial interests in local government).
The UK Bribery Act (UKBA) 2010 consolidated and
updated the existing legislation.
Apart from the limited domestic jurisdictional reach
of the longstanding pre-UKBA legislation (though the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 gave
them extra-territorial jurisdiction), much of the lack of
interest in bribery overseas arose from perceptions
among government departments on what was or was
not acceptable abroad in terms of the primacy of UK
economic/political interests (see Doig, 2011),
particularly involving countries where corruption was
prevalent or a pragmatic necessity in a highly-
competitive export environment (see Gutterman,
2017).
Neither the 2001 extension of the jurisdiction of
existing legislation, nor being a signatory to the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
were enough to address the concerns of OECD’s
Working Group on the Convention about the
adequacy of the UK’s response to bribery in the
international context. Indeed, the inadequacy of
the legislative framework, including the inadequacy
of corporate criminal liability alongside this in terms
of, for example, the restrictive nature of identification
principle (Lord, 2014), for both the domestic and the
international context had long been a concern of a
range of bodies, from 1976 Royal Commission on
Standards of Conduct in Public Life to the UK’s
ratification of UNCAC in 2006. This was publicly
accepted by UK governments and led (a) to the UKBA
and a number of policy and strategy documents; and
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(b) in order to implement the intent of the UKBA for the
international context, a clearly-defined set of
institutional changes and resourcing arrangements
within a very public statement of commitment
through a ‘landmark’ [sic] international anti-corruption
summit in London in 2016.
The research context and methodology
The absence of similar changes and arrangements for
effective implementation of the UKBA for the
domestic context is reflected in the 2018 City of
London Police’s statement that, while it has lead
responsibility for fraud within the UK, there is no lead
responsibility for bribery within the UK and, even if
there was, there would be ‘a need for infrastructure,
investment and resourcing’ to ensure an effective law
enforcement response (House of Lords Bribery Act
Committee, 2018, p. 15). This suggests a change to
the historical divergence in terms of priorities for the
domestic and international contexts, and a major
research gap in terms of the contemporary nature
and control of domestic bribery. This paper
contributes to the current discourse on bribery in the
UK by asking if there is a divergence in enforcement
of domestic and international bribery by the UK
through four research questions:
. Does the contemporary response to domestic and
international bribery diverge?
. What do we know about the nature, extent and
scope of domestic bribery in the UK?
. If the contemporary responses to domestic and
international bribery diverge, are there identifiable
reasons for this?
. What are the implications for future approaches to
bribery in the domestic context?
The research was undertaken between October 2016
and September 2018 with funding from the British
Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grants 2016
round. The research involved both intensive and
extensive research approaches and the
implementation of mixed methods over three phases
to triangulate and corroborate the findings:
. A systematic search of the literature to identify
relevant academic and ‘grey’ scholarship on
bribery and corruption, as well as a desk review of
official reports and publications (see Saunders,
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009).
. A Freedom of Information (FOI) request to all police
forces in the UK plus specialist anti-corruption
enforcement authorities such as the Serious Fraud
Office (SFO), the Ministry of Defence Police and the
City of London Police (N = 45; all replied) to
establish the number, type and outcome of cases
recorded for investigation in relation to the bribery
of public and/or private sector personnel under
the 1889, 1906, 1916 and 2010 Acts.
. Semi-structured interviews with six informed
experts in the areas of anti-bribery and corruption,
including senior prosecutors, and senior bribery
trainers and investigators, to gain insight into the
nature of domestic bribery and issues relating to
the regulation and control of these behaviours.
Is there a divergence? Legal framework,
government attention, institutional change,
and the research issue
Legal context
Bribery is a transactional crime—it consists of an illicit
exchange involving the transfer of a benefit to the
recipient(s), directly or indirectly, immediately and
over a longer term, which may comprise both
monetary payments and other types of inducements,
to facilitate the circumventing of legally prescribed
rules and procedures, and usually consists of the
abuse or misuse of otherwise ‘normal’ relationships
(Doig, 2006, p. 116), to the advantage of the provider
directly or on behalf of another party. Note that the
terms ‘corruption’ and ‘bribery’ are often used
interchangeably. Corruption is essentially about the
‘corruption’ of public office or its use for private,
personal or partisan interests. This may take a
number of criminalized forms, such as embezzlement
or bribery, or ethical issues, such as conflict of
interest or nepotism; this paper focuses on bribery, as
defined by the UKBA. In legal terms, common law
offences of bribery and embracery (bribery of a juror)
in England and Wales, and bribery and accepting a
bribe in Scotland, have existed for centuries, with
focus placed on the corruption of those in ‘public
office’ (whose definition invariably relied on case law
interpretation).
This was reinforced in statute: the Public Bodies
Corrupt Practices Act 1889 sought to criminalize local
government officials acting ‘corruptly’ in connection
to their public body. The Prevention of Corruption
Act 1906 brought into scope the private sector
(agents acting corruptly in relation to a principal’s
business) and central government officials. The
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 introduced a
presumption of corruption component, shifting the
burden of proof to public sector defendants to prove
that their behaviours were not corrupt in offences
involving public sector contracts under the 1889 and
1906 Acts where it had already been proved that a
bribe had been given or received. In 2002, the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 came into
force and introduced an overseas element to ensure
that bribery and corruption, as legislated for in the
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Prevention of Corruption Acts, committed by UK
persons in other jurisdictions was also punishable in
the UK.
This latter amendment was an attempt to satisfy the
requirements of the OECD’s 1997 Anti-Bribery
Convention. However, the OECD’s monitoring process
considered the changes in the 2001 Act to be
insufficient and recommended ‘that the UK proceed
at the earliest opportunity to enact a comprehensive
anti-corruption statute’ (OECD, 2003, p. 17). The
outcome was the UKBA, which consolidated all
bribery offences, accounting for domestic and foreign
bribery by natural and legal persons, and including
four specific offences relating to giving or offering a
bribe, receiving or soliciting a bribe, bribing a foreign
public official, and a failure of commercial
organizations to prevent bribery. The UKBA refers to
bribery as the offering, promising or giving (active
bribery), or the requesting, agreeing to receive or
accepting (passive bribery) of a financial or other
advantage with the intention to induce improper
performance in relation to a relevant function or
activity (such as a public function or in the course of
employment).
Government attention
In line with this developing legal framework, corruption
and bribery were identified as a high-priority public
policy concern by the UK government (see HM
Government, 2014). They also remain high on the
agenda of other sovereign states and inter-
governmental bodies such as the UNODC, the
Working Group on the OECD Convention and the
European Union (see European Commission, 2014).
The 2016 Anti-Corruption Summit convened by the
UK government spelt out the rhetoric of the UK’s
commitment in terms of the international context,
and the UK government also stated that corruption is
a threat to the UK’s ‘national security and prosperity,
both at home and overseas’ (HM Government, 2017,
p. 7). The then Home Secretary Amber Rudd asserted
that ‘although the UK enjoys higher levels of integrity
than many other countries, we are not immune from
the effects of corruption. Stories of corruption can
undermine confidence in the institutions and the
business reputation more widely’ (HM Government,
2017, p. 7, 5).
The UK government has taken an active role in
developing a policy framework to address bribery.
The 2014 Anti-Corruption Plan, which has both
domestic and international perspectives, outlined the
government’s intention to build a better picture of
the threat from corruption and the ways in which the
UK is vulnerable by increasing protection against the
organized criminals who corrupt public sector
officials; strengthening integrity in key sectors and
institutions; and strengthening the UK’s law
enforcement response to more effectively pursue
those who engage in corruption or launder their
corrupt funds in the UK. Most recently, the UK Anti-
Corruption Strategy 2017–2022 was published
focusing on six priorities: reducing the insider threat
in high-risk domestic sectors such as borders and
ports; reducing corruption in public procurement
and grants; promoting integrity across the public and
private sectors; strengthening the integrity of the UK
as an international financial centre; improving the
business environment globally; and working with
other countries to combat corruption.
Institutional change
In addition to the policy framework and a very public
commitment to addressing corruption underlined by
the Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016, where several
commitments were made by the UK government as
part of a drive to ‘galvanize a global response to
tackle corruption’, the government also introduced
institutional reforms. Most of these, however, were
focused on or prioritized international bribery.
On the enactment of the UKBA, the SFO was
designated with lead responsibility for international
cases, to whom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) staff were advised to report allegations (FCO,
2011; see also OECD, 2017, p. 104). In the same year,
an All-Party Parliamentary Group on Anti-Corruption
was established to bring together interested members
of the House of Commons and House of Lords to raise
awareness of the impact of international corruption
and to enhance and strengthen UK anti-corruption
policies and mechanisms. In 2014, the government
established a post of Anti-Corruption Champion. In
2015, an Inter-Ministerial Group on Anti-Corruption
was created and the City of London Police Overseas
Anti-corruption Unit, along with the Metropolitan
Police’s International Proceeds of Corruption Unit, were
transferred to the National Crime Agency’s (NCA’s)
Economic Crime Command to become the
International Corruption Unit (ICU), funded largely by
the Department for International Development (DFID)
and with some 50 staff focusing on bribery, money
laundering and financial sanctions evasion (see Harvey,
this issue). An integrated approach to restitution of
illicit funds held in the UK was drafted and agreed by
a number of agencies (see Campbell & Lord, 2018).
In July 2017, the International Anti-Corruption
Coordination Centre (IACCC), hosted within the NCA,
was launched to bring together specialist law
enforcement officers from multiple agencies around
the world to tackle allegations of high-level corruption
where co-ordination and cooperation was crucial. In
December 2017, the UK government announced the
creation of the National Economic Crime Centre
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(NECC)—also hosted within the NCA—in order to plan,
task and co-ordinate operational responses across
agencies bringing together the UK’s capabilities to
tackle economic crime more effectively, with particular
focus on bribery and corruption. It also established a
memorandum of understanding in 2017, entitled
‘Tackling Foreign Bribery’, signed between various law
enforcement bodies, including the SFO, the City of
London Police, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS),
the Scottish government’s Crown Office and
Procurator Fiscal Service, the Financial Conduct
Authority, the Ministry of Defence Police, the NCA and
HM Revenue and Customs. Further legislative reform—
such as ‘unexplained wealth orders’ (UWO) under the
Criminal Finances Act 2017—has underlined the
continuing emphasis on the international context
(even though such orders were addressed
domestically through applications to the UK High Court).
Developing the research issue: reviewing the
domestic context
The UK continues to be rated an ‘active enforcer’
(Transparency International, 2018) of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention in the international context based
on the number of investigations commenced and
sanctions brought in relation to its share of world
exports (only six other countries are considered
‘active’). Yet, in contrast to the developments
outlined above, it was being argued that bribery
within the UK has not been given the same level of
attention and support as it has in the international
context, despite both domestic and external criticisms
of this: an early UNCAC review noted that ‘there is no
typology of corruption available, or any analysis and
evaluation of the situation in the UK… nor is there
any specialised agency which is responsible for a
centralized co-ordination of nation-wide anti-
corruption work’ (UNODC, 2011, p. 7; see also
Transparency International, 2011).
A few years later, in 2018, evidence to a House of
Lords inquiry into the UKBA from a senior officer from
the City of London Police noted that ‘domestically, the
picture has not been articulated particularly well. The
spotlight has not been on what happens within the
United Kingdom and the response to it. One might say
that that allows the growth of corrupt activity, as we
are not really focusing on those aspects’ (House of
Lords Bribery Act Committee, 2018, q108). In the same
year, GRECO noted that, in relation to what it terms
‘persons who are entrusted with top executive
functions’, it ‘did not come across a co-ordinated
system for analysing major corruption risk factors… in
an unconditional strategic manner at central
governmental level’ (GRECO, 2018, p. 13).
The paper argues that, while the legislative
framework and the publication of policy documents
suggest a common approach by governments, that
approach diverges in terms of institutional changes
and resourcing arrangements. Thus the question
underpinning our research was why there appears to
be a lack of implementation focus on bribery in the
domestic context?
What do we know about the nature, extent
and scope of domestic bribery in the UK?
The scale of domestic bribery
In the second phase of the research, the FOI data
showed the actual number of recorded cases of
domestic bribery in the UK. Table 1 presents the
absolute number of bribery offences recorded by UK
police forces from 1989 onward and differentiated by
the legislation used. The recording periods of the
different forces varied quite significantly—some
forces’ records went back to 1989, while others only
recorded one year, making direct comparison of the
pre- and post-Bribery Act periods impossible. Forty
two out of the 47 forces and authorities surveyed
provided detail as to whether the offences were
recorded under the Bribery Act 2010 or earlier
legislation. However, in five responses, the specific
legislation was not noted, though the year of
recording was provided (except for one force) and in
these cases we inferred that those recorded in 2011
onwards would have been recorded under the UKBA.
For research data, this means that one case included
in the 202 pre-UKBA legislation cases may have been a
UKBA offence, and that 58 of the cases included in the
125 post-UKBA figure may have been offences relating
to earlier legislation: this may be due to the time delay
between offence and detection, and the inability to
make UKBA charges retrospective. However, the
figure of 58 includes 41 cases recorded by Police
Scotland, all of which were recorded between 2013
and 2016. According to Police Scotland, ‘crimes in
Scotland are recorded in accordance with the
Scottish Government Justice Department crime
classification codes and are not thereafter
subcategorised’ (FOI response). It is therefore possible
that some of these 41 cases were pre-UKBA offences,
though we cannot estimate how many.
Based on responses to the FOI requests, 327 bribery
offences were recorded between 1989 and 2017,
including 125 since the UKBA came into force in
2011. If we break down the data further, authorities
with national jurisdiction, such as the Ministry of
Table 1. Recorded bribery data (1989–2017).
Legal framework (dates) Number of recorded cases
Prevention of Corruption Acts (1989–2011) 202
UKBA (2011–2017) 125
Total 327
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Defence Police (63 cases between 1999 and 2016) and
the SFO (43 cases between 2012 and 2016), recorded
the highest number of cases. In terms of police forces,
Thames Valley Police, (44), Police Scotland (41), West
Mercia Police (22), the Police Service of Northern
Ireland (15), Warwickshire Police (12) and Greater
Manchester Police (12) recorded the highest
numbers. For the time period 2011–2017 (which may
not entirely be cases investigated under the UKBA), a
total of 125 cases was recorded, with the greatest
numbers recorded by Police Scotland (41), Thames
Valley Police (15) and Greater Manchester Police (11).
Given the problematic variation in time periods for
which responses were received, and to provide a
better reflection of recorded cases over time, we
calculated the rate of recording per year for each
force. From this analysis, it can be seen that the
Ministry of Defence Police and SFO recorded a high
number of total cases, with 3.5 and 8.6 cases per
year. In terms of constabulary police forces, Police
Scotland (10.2), Thames Valley Police (4.8) and West
Mercia Police (2.2) have the highest rate of recording
per year. For the period 2011–2017, the analysis
indicates that the forces with the highest rate of
recording of UKBA offences were Police Scotland
(7.5), Thames Valley Police (2.7) and Greater
Manchester Police (2). The current research thus
suggests that while a significant minority of UK police
forces have had no recorded domestic cases under
the UKBA, some 25 police forces plus the Ministry of
Defence Police and the SFO have had a total of 125
cases over a 6-year period (or ≈21 a year).
The research data were triangulated against the
annual average of cases with two further sets of data.
The first was provided by the Home Office on cases
brought under the 1889 and 1906 Acts (the 1916 Act
increased the maximum penalty under these Acts for
certain offences) between 1965 and 1978—see Table 2.
These data suggest that the annual average number
of cases brought under the 1889 Act was less than
three, while the number brought under the 1906 Act
was over 30; conspiracy to commit corruption cases
were less than four per year. The other set of data
was provided by the Office for National Statistics
(ONS) in 2018 when it published for the first time
data on corruption related offences recorded by the
police. These ‘experimental statistics’ include all four
UKBA offences, plus the offence of misconduct in
public office—see Table 3.
As the ONS indicates, other than for unlawful deaths,
police recorded crime data are not designated as
national statistics. Furthermore, data collected prior to
April 2018 are not comparable with data after April
2018, as improvements in data collection procedures
mean that for the period April to June 2018, data
were only available from 38 of the 43 police forces in
England and Wales. In terms of bribery specifically,
the absolute numbers of recorded offences here are
low relative to the FOI data but it is very difficult to
make comparisons between the two years of
corruption data published by the ONS (currently
classed as Experimental) and the FOI data, because
they relate to different numbers of police forces and
varying time periods of available recorded data
across forces. Most offences in the ONS data relate to
the broader construct of ‘misconduct in public office’
which can range from the exploitation of an official
position to facilitate a personal or sexual relationship,
or acting while under a conflict of interest in a
prejudicial manner (see Law Commission, 2016),
raising questions over how many may involve bribery.
Nevertheless, when comparing the current data
with the data in Tables 2 and 3, the number of
recorded cases shows no significant increase or
decrease since 1965. If a small number of significant
variations often occasioned by a single case with
multiple offences and offenders are taken into
account, then the number per force is about two to
three recorded cases a year. There are other means at
the disposal of police forces, including decisions
taken by local police forces to investigate under the
Fraud Act 2006 (for example fraud by abuse of
position) cases where bribery allegedly occurred, and
by the CPS to prosecute accordingly; the use of
money laundering provisions in the Proceeds of
Crime Act (POCA); the use of the 1889 Act for
offences committed prior to the coming into force of
the UKBA; and—for the moment—the common law
offence of misconduct in public office. Within the
limits of the research and the current state of
recorded bribery data—which continues to be a
function of what is chosen to report, record, and
investigate, and by whom—the paper has
demonstrated that there continue to be few bribery
Table 2. Bribery offences from 1965 to 1978 (Doig, 1984).
Charges
Crown Court
Cases Annual average Convicted
1889 Act; s1(1) 43 >2.9 32
1889 Act; s1(2) 24 >1.6 23
1906 Act s1 483 >32.0 350
Conspiracy to commit corruption 52 >3.4 45






Offences relating to offering,
promising or giving bribes (s.1 and
s.6 UKBA)
13 9 22
Offences relating to requesting,




prevent associate bribing another
with intent to obtain or retain
business or advantage (s.7 UKBA)
0 1 1
Misconduct in a public office 62 106 168
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cases and that there is little evidence from which it may
reasonably be concluded whether or not the UKBA has
had an impact on levels of domestic cases investigated
or prosecuted.
The nature and scope of domestic bribery
The FOI data provided qualitative insights into the
nature of the cases, as descriptions were provided by
forces as to whether the bribery was public or private,
domestic or international, and the outcome of the
case. However, the information was very inconsistent,
with some forces providing elaborate accounts of the
bribery offences, some providing brief and unspecific
accounts, for example ‘corruption (public sector)’;
some providing no description at all other than
stating the offence (for example a section 1 UKBA
violation, or ‘giving bribe’); and, finally, some
providing nothing beyond the number of cases and
year recorded. Most cases were recorded under
section 1 of the UKBA (offering, promising or giving a
bribe), section 1 of POCA (primarily in SFO cases, but
in other forces also) and section 1 of the Public
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889. From the data
collated, many of those involved had a modest socio-
economic status. The range of actors implicated in
the FOI responses and (where available) an indication
of the purpose of the bribe shows low-level
appointments (such as driving test inspectors, hotel
workers and planning officers) and routine offences
(insider information, award contracts etc.); there was
no data in the FOI responses about the financial value
of the bribes. However, in other research analysing
domestic and international bribery in England and
Wales, domestic bribes tend to be ‘cheaper’ than
foreign ones (Andresen & Button, 2018, p. 9). More
specifically, 95% of convictions involving bribes under
£100,000 were domestic (and 5% were overseas),
whereas only 40% of convictions involving bribes
over £100,000 were domestic, with 60% overseas
(Andresen & Button, 2018). This was later reinforced
in interviews with senior CPS staff who alluded to
domestic bribery involving relatively small amounts in
terms of payments made and a wide geography of
cases. Overall, domestic cases coming to the CPS
were generally lower-level, ‘petty’ bribery cases and
involve small businesses rather than larger, more
complex schemes. That said, small and medium size
enterprises can be more readily prosecuted and so
may appear more in official data. The data received
do not indicate anything about the lapse of time
from offence commission to reporting/recording to
investigation or to prosecution; nor about the
benefits sought from the bribes, which might be
larger from overseas cases, being mainly about very
large contracts. The scale of the rewards sought
might account for their higher average bribe size.
Only a few forces provided enough information for
insights into the ‘bribers’, i.e. those who gave, offered
or promised a bribe. More detail is given on the
‘bribee’, i.e. those who were offered or accepted a
bribe. These included most notably bribes offered by
private sector actors to those with decision-making
responsibilities for awarding public contracts. Many of
the Ministry of Defence Police cases involved the
offering or accepting of bribes, including hospitality
and gifts, for rewarding contracts to subcontractors,
while there were several cases of commercial bribery,
again to influence to provision of business to
suppliers and subcontractors. There were also several
instances of driving test examiners being bribed.
Finally, the data provided numerical information as
to the outcome of the cases investigated by
respondent forces—see Table 4.
The figure of 100 for ‘no details on outcomes
provided’ is distorted by two FOI responses: Thames
Valley Police (44) and Police Scotland (41). In both
responses, no details were provided as to the
outcomes of the offences recorded. Police Scotland
does not have responsibility for charging cases,
meaning outcome data was not available through the
FOI request. This responsibility falls to the Crown
Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS). The
COPFS website contains data on all recorded offences:
however, corruption is included as ‘Other crimes of
dishonesty’, a category that includes forgery (other),
‘reset’ (receiving stolen goods) and embezzlement.
Consequently, it is not possible to disaggregate this
down to a specific focus on bribery. No further action
is the most common outcome. Details provided
indicated this was often due to insufficient evidence or
evidential difficulties, no suspects identified or victims/
allegers withdrawing support. The outcomes ‘referred
elsewhere’ and ‘internal discipline’ all related to the
Ministry of Defence FOI response.
Are there reasons for the divergence in
terms of the domestic context?
In summary, the paper demonstrates that bribery in the
domestic context is not, numerically or in terms of the
status of those investigated or decisions and actions
Table 4. Outcomes of recorded bribery cases.
No further action 97
Charge 93




Adult restorative disposal 2
Community resolution 1
Offence changed 1
Formal action (unspecified) 1
No details on outcomes provided 100
Total 327
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involved, significant. The UK approach, whether
strategic or institutional, has focused on the
international context, in part because of the drivers
for reform and in part because of the UK’s very public
commitment to taking a proactive role in addressing
international bribery. There may not be significant
numbers of cases in the domestic context and, unlike
the transnational corporations arraigned by the SFO,
few involve corporations with a high visibility or
reputational significance to attract the attention of
the SFO and national/international media. The third
phase of the research therefore sought to explore
reasons as to why there may be a divergence in
responses in the domestic and international contexts.
The first explanation we found was that the levels
and types of cases—or at least the levels of known
cases—in the domestic context, as well as the
outcomes of cases, do not create a climate of concern
in themselves. The lack of centralization of information
means lack of sufficient records/comparable data
which indeed inhibits awareness, which may lead to
the self-fulfilling prophecy that if there are not many
cases or serious cases of domestic bribery (based on
the data) then a different response is not necessary on
the basis of the existing evidence (see also Walburg,
2015). Sometimes, low data may be a reason for
concern, reflecting incompetence/corruption of the
criminal justice process, but there are no clear grounds
for suspicion that this is the explanation here.
Second, interviews with senior CPS staff suggested
that most bribery cases that came to their attention
involved ‘abuse by managers’, for example diverting
funds, sometimes via separate companies, and
bribing to maintain concealment, alongside many
cases that involved using bribery to maintain
subcontracts in business, as the FOI data indicated
also. This level of case also does not attract official
concern, even though interview data may indicate
that domestic bribery reflects, as one investigator
argued, a ‘continuing undercurrent of corruption’ (see
also the Chartered Institute of Building, 2013; Fazekas,
2015) and where interviewees pointed out that
official statistics on bribery and corruption do not
give accurate figures. Thus the research highlights
that, collectively, the known cases do not show a
level of seriousness that demands official or media
attention (and despite reporting on cases that,
individually, included multi-million pound public
sector contracts, football, the Royal Household, a £4.9
million bribe for supermarket supplies, domestic
companies charged with failing to have adequate
procedures, the involvement of the SFO and so on;
see, for example, http://www.elexica.com/en/resources/
microsite/uk-bribery-act/corruption-enforcement-tracker).
This confirms the research on media treatment of
fraud, which likewise is tilted towards glamorous and
‘famous name’ cases (Levi, 2006).
Third, the divergence may be related to the current
law enforcement approach which makes very little
provision for bribery as a domestic law enforcement
issue. In the case of fraud, which has been subject to
review and institutional change, a lead police force—
the City of London police—is responsible for training
provision through its Economic Crime Academy.
There is a centralized reporting process through
Action Fraud and then the dissemination of
investigative packages through the National Fraud
Intelligence Bureau (although there continue to be
concerns over fraud investigation capacity within
police forces; see, for example, Skidmore et al this
issue). In the case of bribery, as the City of London
Police have noted, ‘as a national lead force for fraud
and other economic crime, we have a degree of co-
ordination to enable us to do that, but we do not do
it for bribery and corruption… there is no domestic
sharing of intelligence on bribery’ (House of Lords
Bribery Act Committee, 2018, p. 4, 13). This latter
issue was not helped by the recent refusal of the
Home Office to fund an extension of the Action
Fraud database and reporting mechanisms to include
bribery. The overall perception of the priority given to
the domestic bribery is a consequence of ‘the focus
on grand international corruption, rather than the
everyday corruption that you might see in society’
(House of Lords Bribery Act Committee, 2018, p. 26).
Further, prosecutorial discretion and data recording
can also shape the corruption picture in the UK. For
instance, many corruption cases have:
… been prosecuted with ‘fraud by abuse of position’ …
This enables them to think that there is no corruption
going on in the UK because no one has been
prosecuted for it. They’ve been prosecuted for
something else (interview with NGO actor).
The logic of this argument implies that low absolute
numbers of bribery/corruption prosecutions accounts
for there being no (apparent) corruption. However, it
is more likely to be a reflection on decision-making
within the public authorities about when and on
what charges to prosecute corruption. This might also
reflect the consent needed from the Director of
Public Prosecutions (DPP) for a bribery prosecution or
the Attorney General (AG) for a corruption offence;
such consent, from either the DPP or the AG, is not
needed for prosecuting the offence of ‘fraud by
abuse of position’, and thus the option of fraud
prosecution offers a less bureaucratically complicated
approach.
Fourth, there continues to be pressure from internal
and external organizations that influence the
enforcement priorities in terms of domestic and
international bribery. For instance, the presence of
intense scrutiny by inter-governmental bodies, such as
the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery, into how the
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UK is implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
is a major external factor (the UK government is
required to communicate in person four times a year
what is being done to meet the requirements of the
convention). Consequently, it would be unsurprising
that policy and enforcement focus has been placed on
the response to international bribery which, in an
ambience of resource austerity, may detract from
pursuing domestic bribery:
… the attention to domestic corruption is swamped by
the SFO and NCA’s major focus on international
corruption where they have specific mandates and
where the latter’s ICU [International Corruption Unit] is
DFID-funded for that role (interview with law
enforcement actor).
Fifth, while specific mandates and capacity have been
created for national policing authorities, such as the
SFO and the NCA, these are concerned with
international bribery, rather than supporting local
efforts against domestic bribery. This has been
exacerbated by continuing funding cuts to fraud
squads within local police forces who normally deal
with bribery cases (see Doig, 2018). In addition, there
have been wider changes in terms of domestic
monitoring of the risk of bribery and appropriate
institutional responses, including the abolition of
both the NFA and the Audit Commission which took
a leading role in monitoring levels of fraud and
bribery, as well as running a national annual data-
mining and matching initiative, and developing
comprehensive performance assessment reviews to
ensure relevant policies and procedures were in place.
Finally, the nature and profile of domestic bribery
may in itself attract less attention because, according
to one police interviewee, it is less overt and often less
tangible in comparison to the nature—and traceability
—of bribery in the international context. Domestic
bribery is often an extension of embedded social
relation(ships) and ways of operating rather than
merely specific one-off bribery transactions. The
context often relates to critical ‘touch points’—how
and where connections are made, grooming through
social and sporting occasions, shared peer groups and
similar interests—as the basis for favours for friends
within a shared social setting. Here there may be no
bribe for specific actions but, developing from existing
relationships and connectivity, a reciprocity within
potentially corrupt relationships that is justifiable in
terms of friendship or helping each other. Thus the
bribes are less explicit tangible, material inducements
than more subtle benefits (for example hospitality,
employment of relatives, discounts, and so on) where
there may have no direct tangible exchange, or
specific payments for specified outcomes.
Taking the strands noted above together, there is a
divergence in how government approaches bribery in
the domestic and international contexts. This has
meant that, where once domestic bribery was
addressed more rigorously than bribery in the
international context, this may be being steadily
reversed, in terms of signalled priorities, resources and
institutional responses. The paper concludes that this
has come about because of a lack of governmental
concern and prioritization. The consequence has also
meant that, unlike the international context, the
domestic context lacks institutional focus, central
collation of data, resources, and appropriate training
when compared to the approach to transnational bribery.
What are the implications for future
approaches to bribery in the domestic
context?
The lack of ownership or co-ordination of the UK
approach to domestic bribery is the consequence of
an absence of a collective push to build up a national
profile of domestic bribery and the infrastructure that
would implement the existing policy statements. This
has important implications for the effective policing
of bribery in the domestic context. The areas we
believe need to be addressed and possible
consequences if no initiative is taken to redress the
divergence follow.
Data on corruption
First, our research raised several notable data issues,
including the absence of a centralized register of
bribery or corruption offences in the UK. This creates
difficulties for determining the scale, extent and
nature of domestic bribery. In previous years, the
Public Sector Corruption Index (PSCI) provided a
centralized register of all corruption offences. The
index was set up as one of the recommendations of
the 1976 Royal Commission and required all police
forces to report allegations of corruption to the
Metropolitan and City Police Company Fraud Branch
(as it then was) which would maintain a register and
would undertake a collating, evaluation and co-
ordinating role. This Index was initially held by the
Metropolitan Police before being moved to the
Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA, now
NCA) before being allowed to lapse.
Related to this issue, as highlighted in the systematic
use of FOI requests to obtain data from across UK
policing agencies, is the current inconsistency of data
collection and retention methods. There are no
centralized expectations on how data should be
stored, what data should be recorded, and for how
long the data should be retained. We found that how
far back data records go is dependent on individual
force policies, ranging from over 20 years to 12
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months. The data that are available also vary in detail,
with some forces supplying rich, contextual insight
into individual cases, but others only superficial
numbers, although this may reflect internal decisions
over which, or how much, information to share. This
is further complicated as different software and
systems are being used across the different forces
which, in turn, creates compatibility issues. For
instance, Police Scotland gave details of 41 recorded
‘corruption’ offences since 2013 but, while these data
include the Acts for which data was requested, we
cannot be certain that they did not also include non-
bribery offences. In other cases, some forces withheld
some information due to sensitivities relating to
potentially identifiable cases.
Prosecutorial discretion
Second, as mentioned earlier, the interviews with
senior CPS actors indicated that many substantive
bribery cases may be prosecuted as ‘fraud by abuse
of position’ under the Fraud Act 2006, also reflecting
police force decisions to record as fraud rather than
bribery. Decisions over whether to pursue as bribery
or fraud depends on several factors where the police
look to expedite provable offences associated with
the same criminality by considering which is ‘easiest’
to prove, where evidence is most readily available,
and whether there is a corporate aspect to the case
and which penalties can be invoked. We are not
arguing that these judgments are unreasonable, but
their unintended effect is to make collective
assessment of harm and risk difficult.
Institutional configuration and engagement
Third is the current institutional configuration and
engagement. Although the Home Office and Cabinet
Office have presented a policy perspective in reducing
domestic bribery, this has not been resourced or
allocated in terms of institutional ownership (as
opposed to guidance) and thus remains rhetorical,
particularly as these bodies have a small staff with a
policy or strategic rather than an operational focus.
The abolition of the Audit Commission has underlined
the significance of roles of, and co-ordination
between, other audit or oversight bodies or regulators,
where issues of awareness, prevention and reporting,
especially those proposed in policy and strategy
documents, may remain unmonitored or unreviewed
for effective implementation.
Apart from the central role played by the City of
London Police Economic Crime Academy in training
police officers, and some limited guidance by the
College of Policing, there is currently no central unit
or resourcing for the support of local police forces for
what are (by the standards of most other cases)
complex, resource- and time-intensive investigations.
The result may be cases not pursued because they
require co-ordination, often where there may be
cross-police boundaries. Within local policing, and
apart from the roles of police professional standards
units for police corruption and Special Operations
Units (de facto regional organized crime units linked
to the NCA and focused on economic crime
committed by organized crime groups), strategies for
the investigation of fraud, including bribery, continue
to have limited effect in persuading police forces to
commit appropriate resources (Doig, 2018).
Political and enforcement complacency
Finally, the absence of a major scandal or a major
corporation or municipal body may have led to a
‘complacency’ around domestic bribery (interview
with NGO actor). For instance, while the UK’s role is
recognized in the international side of bribery, such
as in terms of the financial and professional services
sectors intentionally or otherwise servicing corrupt
foreigners with money laundering opportunities, or in
terms of UK companies exporting bribes, bribery
occurring within the UK is not part of the UK psyche
(interview with NGO actor). Whether a drip-feed of
domestic bribery cases can amount to enough to
change the complacency and close the divergence is
not clear.
Conclusions
Through our four research questions, we identified that
there is a divergence in the approach to domestic and
international bribery by the UK. We found that there
are data, and assumptions, about the number, type
and significance of cases in the domestic context that
have not resulted in anything approaching the levels
of responses that bribery in the international context
has achieved. The response to transnational bribery
has been driven not only by government commitment
but also by implementing that commitment through
specific institutional and resourcing changes. This has
led to a divergent approach to addressing bribery in
the domestic and international contexts which will
have adverse implications for the prevention,
detection, and investigation of bribery generally.
Operationally, levels and types of domestic bribery
may be under-reported because of investigative and
prosecutorial choices. More widely, we found that the
interplay between national strategies and initiatives,
organizational priorities, international commitments
and institutional and other responses in relation to
bribery remain a continuing dynamic that has
favoured the international context over the domestic
context. Our research may point to both a limited
number of cases and low levels of complexity or
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status of those involved to explain the absence of an
equivalent response in the domestic context. While
there is no evidence of significant levels of bribery in
the domestic context, however, the failure to respond
in policy, institutional and resource terms could lead
to slow reaction to any emerging rise in scale or
significance in the domestic context in the future.
The need for valid data on corruption
A key issue is the reliance on enforcement data to
provide insights into the nature and levels of bribery,
as such data are an artefact of enforcement activities
and reporting mechanisms. Alongside this, there is an
absence of valid empirical data on the extent and
scope of bribery offences. Social scientific
methodologies utilizing self-report or victimization
studies may contribute to informing this debate, but
the particular nature or bribery presents obstacles:
the inherently clandestine nature, the lack of
identifiable victims and consequences, the invisibility
of those involved in the corrupt transaction given
they consent to (or otherwise incentivized to remain
silent) and benefit from the arrangements, are all
factors that undermine such approaches. For these
reasons, we suggest more can be gained analytically
by developing fuller theoretical accounts of the
nature of bribery in the UK so as to inform
‘intelligence-led’ interventions and to pursue
deliberative methods that utilize the expertise and
informed judgement of key stakeholders in this area,
with a view to forecasting potential future scenarios
of bribery that indicate sectors, areas, issues that may
emerge as priority concerns for academia, policy and
practice. These offer potential future research areas.
Current and future scenarios of corruption
In the wider domestic context, unlawful payments—
often addressed in a number of contexts, by a range
of agencies under various pieces of legislation—are
one of the sources that undermine the integrity of UK
systems and democratic processes. Whether in
business, such as the awarding of contracts in the
construction sector, or public services, such as NHS
staff accepting excessive hospitality to promote
certain products and services, or the financing of
political and election campaigns by commercial and
other interests, a lack of perceived fairness can
reduce legitimacy, and this permeates into society
more widely. Furthermore, as we see the emergence
of new sectors, such as the explosion of FinTech
companies and public and private services provided
via the ‘internet of things’, there is potential for
bribery in such industries that may put at risk
individual and workplace data security. In addition,
the potential for using new technologies for bribery,
such as utilizing anonymised cryptocurrencies as
material inducements is also emerging, though very
little is known about the nature of such activities.
For such reasons, in order to reduce the divergence
and reinforce the domestic focus, there is a need for
better and more detailed data, the presence of a
single lead for the domestic context and the
availability of training for relevant staff which would
go a long way to anticipating such issues. In the
meantime, however, the we have drawn attention to
the absence of a national response and guidance to
bribery in the domestic context that, given the quite
substantial response for the international context, is a
significant policy and strategy gap. In conclusion,
governments should ensure that they have access to
the appropriate levels of data to monitor the
domestic context so that they may be alert to such
issues in the future and address the identified
divergence to enhance the implementation of the
UKBA in the domestic as well as in the international
contexts.
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